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ABSTRACT 
Using daily data from the Czech Republic in 1/1/1998-31/12/2002, we find that foreign 
exchange intervention activity is determined by the degree of exchange rate misalignment and 
lagged intervention. Additionally, inflation targeting regime is a binding constraint of 
intervention activity.  
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1. Introduction 
Several studies have recently analyzed the determinants of central bank’s foreign 
exchange (FX) intervention activity under flexible exchange rates (Almekinders and 
Eijffinger, 1994, 1996; Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Neely, 2002; Kim and Sheen, 
2002; Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann, 2004; and Ito and Yabu, 2006). Typically, 
they find that central bank (CB hereafter) intervenes in the FX market, when the 
exchange rate is largely misaligned and/or excessively volatile.1  
 
To our knowledge, CB intervention literature does not explicitly link FX intervention 
behavior to CB’s main targets, which is low inflation and/or output close to its 
potential. This is striking, as CBs typically do not formulate their FX intervention 
policy in an ad hoc manner (reacting only to information in exchange rate), but rather 
in line with their monetary policy regime oriented towards achieving the targets. In 
this paper, we focus on assessing how monetary policy regime (inflation targeting in 
our case) affects CB’s FX intervention activity. We build on anecdotal evidence by 
Holub (2004), who proposes the criteria for assessing when FX interventions are 
consistent with the inflation targeting regime. The criterion we analyze in this paper is 
simply that the CB should tighten the monetary conditions when inflation and output 
forecast is heading above its targeted value and vice versa. If CB interventions are in 
line with the aforementioned criterion, we label it as consistent with inflation targeting 
(IT consistency hereafter).2  
 
                                                 
1 See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for comprehensive survey of FX intervention literature. 
2 See Holub (2004, p. 14) for evidence when CBs likely violated this criterion.  
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As a result, this paper aims to bridge the gap in evidence on the linkages between FX 
intervention activity and inflation targeting regime using the daily data from the Czech 
Republic. First, we construct a simple indicator of “IT consistency” based on deviation 
of inflation from its target and output gap. Second, we estimate the determinants of FX 
intervention activity employing the measures of exchange rate misalignment and 
volatility and IT consistency. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Data and empirical methodology are described in 
section 2. Results are presented in section 3. Conclusion follows in section 4. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The sample period runs from 1/1/1998 to 31/12/2002. We use daily data on actual FX 
interventions and CZK/EUR exchange rate (prior to 1999 CZK/EUR is retrieved from 
CZK/DEM and irrevocable fixing rate of DEM/EUR). We also employ monthly data 
on net inflation, as the inflation target of the Czech National Bank (CNB) has been 
defined in terms of net inflation during the sample period.3 Real GDP growth data are 
available on a quarterly basis (HP filter is used to estimate potential growth).  
 
                                                 
3 CNB started targeting inflation in 1998. Except inflation developments, the bank reaction function 
includes also output gap. Given the openness of Czech economy, the CNB may also react to exchange 
rate developments in case they seriously jeopardize the inflation prospects. See Kotlan and Navratil 
(2003) on inflation targeting design in the Czech Republic. 
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As mentioned above, we define the inflation targeting consistency variable ( tIT ) using 
the difference between net inflation and inflation target and output gap estimate as 
follows:  
                                         ( ) ( )** ttttt yyIT −−−= βππα                                             (2) 
where tπ  is the yearly net inflation, *tπ  is the inflation target, ty  is actual GDP growth 
and *ty  is an estimate of potential growth. α  and β  is determined by principal 
components. The rationale for using the current values of inflation and output gap 
instead of its forecasts is uncertainty in future developments in an economy 
undergoing massive structural changes during the sample period.4 
 
Generally, we link FX intervention activity to its lagged value (to address the 
persistence of interventions), exchange rate developments and the IT consistency. In 
line with Ito and Yabu (2006), we first estimate the following probit model: 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )MAttttttt ssssssINTP 113211221101 −−−−−− −+−+−+Φ== αααα           (1) 
tINT  denotes a binary variable taking value of one, when the CNB intervenes in day t; 
zero otherwise. ts  is the CZK/EUR exchange rate. 
MA
ts  represents the moving average 
of ts  using 365 days window. As a result, 1α , 2α  and 3α  capture the short-term, 
medium-term and long-term movements of exchange rate, respectively.5 The sign of 
                                                 
4 ITt is interpolated linearly to daily values. Interpolation using different procedures had infinitesimal effect on 
the results in the section 4. 
5 Alternatively, we estimate short-term exchange rate volatility using a GARCH model of and take the estimates 
of medium-term exchange rate misalignment from Babetskii and Egert (2005) and Crespo-Cuaresma, Fidrmuc 
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2α and 3α  is expected to be negative, i.e. intervention activity is inversely related to 
the deviation of the exchange rate from its last month value or its moving average. The 
sign of 1α  is unconstrained (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001), though we expect it to be 
positive, as the CNB sells the domestic currency, when the currency appreciates. It is 
noteworthy that the CNB conducted intervention almost only against the appreciation 
of domestic currency (CNB intervened in 89 days selling the CZK, only 4 days buying 
the CZK out of 1242 sample days)6. 
 
To investigate if the inflation targeting regime served as important constraint of 
CNB’s FX intervention activity, we next estimate regression of the form: 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tMAttttttt ITssssssINTP 4113211221101 βββββ +−+−+−+Φ== −−−−−−           (2) 
Given our definition of tIT , we expect 04 <β ; i.e. CNB is less likely to intervene 
against the appreciation of currency, when the difference between the inflation and its 
target rises (analogously for output gap).  
 
To address the sensitivity of results, we proceed in two steps. First, following Frenkel 
et al. (2004), we define tINT  as the number of consecutive intervention days. Using 
this alternative indicator, we estimate the identical set of FX intervention determinants 
as in (1) and (2) by the negative binomial model. Second, we estimate the following 
equation by OLS: 
                                                                                                                                                        
and MacDonald (2005). The results, using these alternative specifications, are similar to those presented in this 
paper and are available on request. 
6 Given the fact that the intervention has been primarily oriented against appreciation of CZK, we do not opt for 
the ordered probit model. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) tttMAttttttt INTITssssssINT εγγγγγγ +++−+−+−+= −−−−−−− 15411221122110           (3) 
tINT  is defined as in the equation (1) and alternatively using the actual daily FX 
intervention volume.  
 
4. Results 
The monthly intervention volumes and exchange rate developments are presented in 
Figure 1. As apparent from Figure, there has been three major intervention episodes 
associated primarily with the sharp CZK/EUR appreciation (the first half of 1998, end 
of 1999, and mid 2002).   
 
Figure 1 – CZK/EUR exchange rate and intervention volumes 
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Source: Czech National Bank 
Note: The left scale measures the CZK/EUR exchange rate; the right scale measures the monthly FX 
intervention volume in the millions of euro.  
 
Table 1 reports our results on the determinants of FX intervention activity. Typically, 
the CNB does not react to day-to-day exchange rate volatility and rather has been 
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concerned with the medium to long-term exchange rate developments. This is in line 
with the official bank statements expressing that intervention have been conducted 
only when the CZK/EUR appreciated excessively (see Holub, 2004). The results also 
suggest that inflation targeting regime is important constraint for FX intervention 
activity. Concretely, the greater is inflation and output in comparison to their targeted 
values, the less likely the CNB will intervene against domestic currency appreciation.7 
In addition, there is also evidence that FX intervention activity is persistent, to a 
certain extent (though intervention volumes are much less persistent).  
 
Table 1 – Estimation Results 
 Neg. Binomial Probit OLS - indicator OLS - volume 
21 −− − tt ss  1.00 1.08* 0.66 0.67 0.07 0.08 0.63 0.68 
 (0.62) (0.59) (0.44) (0.43) (0.06) (0.06) (0.59) (0.59) 
211 −− − tt ss  -1.26*** -0.85*** -0.58*** -0.41*** -0.05*** -0.24** -0.20*** -0.18*** 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
MA
tt ss 11 −− −  -0.17*** -0.30*** -0.08* -0.13*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
tIT   -0.61***  -0.36*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.07* -0.07* 
  (0.14)  (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
1−tINT       0.52***  0.08** 
      (0.05)  (0.03) 
         
No. of obs. 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R-sqr. 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.33 0.02 0.03 
Note: McFadden’s R-squared for the negative binomial and probit model. Intervention volume is in the 
billions of CZK. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * - denotes significance at 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
  
                                                 
7 The results using a monthly lag of IT to address the potential endogeneity are similar and available on request. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the determinants of FX intervention activity of the Czech 
National Bank. The novelty of our approach is the examination of the role of inflation 
targeting regime on this activity. Subject to various sensitivity tests, we find that 
inflation targeting regime is important constraint for the central bank interventions. 
Besides, central bank reacts to the medium-term exchange rate misalignment. We also 
find that intervention activity is persistent, to a certain extent. 
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